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ABSTRACT
The demobilisation and re-integration of ex-combatants has become an
important element in peace-building. The need for a more holistic, integrated
approach, in which there is greater local ownership of the process, has long been
recognised. However, putting this into practice remains a challenge.
Re-integration ultimately takes place in the community, merging with develop-
ment and post-conflict reconstruction. This study of re-integration in Sierra
Leone uses the concept of ‘participation’ from development discourse, meaning
the extent to which potential stakeholders have a say in how interventions are
designed and implemented. It finds that participation and ownership are only
seen to a limited extent, and only in certain situations. Many of the ex-combatants
who participated in this study felt they did not receive adequate or accurate
information regarding the re-integration process. This undermines the contribu-
tion that re-integration can have to the peace-building project. Participation
proves to be a useful framework for assessing re-integration programmes, and for
planning the more integrated approach that has long been advocated.
INTRODUCTION
Programmes for the disarmament, demobilisation and re-integration (DDR) of
ex-combatants have become a standard element in the package of measures
implemented within the framework of ‘peace-building’. Such programmes deal
with a wide variety of aims in support of a peace process: from security
concerns, stabilisation and management of spoilers, to the social and economic
recovery of the country involved. If anything, however, DDR programmes have
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been a victim of their own success, in the sense that they can be seen as
something that must be applied in most conflict situations, despite the fact that
many voices warn that each DDR programme must relate to its particular
context and conflict.1 The lessons learned to date from situations in which
DDR programmes have been applied have led to discussion of the concept of
‘second generation DDR’, which proposes a wider range of options, so that
programmes can be more flexible and responsive to the local context and to
input from the communities involved.2
The nature of DDR in each particular context helps to define the
international governance of the peace-building and state-building project after
war. This is so even though the patchwork of institutions and norms created for
the purpose is often ad hoc or informal. Disarmament and re-integration
programmes also have a significant bearing on the remaking of domestic
governance, creating a new social contract and setting the context for later
efforts to address transitional justice in the country concerned.
The results of DDR have been mixed. Some studies show real benefits for
those ex-combatants who took part in re-integration programmes, in terms of
their social and economic well-being.3 Others have failed to measure any
significant benefit,4 or have highlighted significant difficulties in trying to bring
about social and economic re-integration,5 especially for women. One of the
difficulties with re-integration programmes is that they interact with a wide
range of issues, from security sector reform6 and transitional justice,7 to political
and economic reconstruction. Sometimes the boundaries and lines of respon-
sibility are not clear. The need for a holistic, integrated approach has long been
recognised,8 but putting this into practice remains a challenge.
The scope of the task and range of actors involved become clear if we
consider the standard UN definition of the last (and most difficult) phase of
DDR:
1Ministry for Foreign Affairs Sweden, Stockholm initiative on disarmament demobilisation
reintegration: Final report (Stockholm, 2006), available at: http://www.sweden.gov.se/content/1/c6/
06/43/56/cf5d851b.pdf (24 April 2006); United Nations, Integrated disarmament, demobilization
and reintegration standards (IDDRS) (2006), available at: http://www.unddr.org/iddrs/
framework.php (2 February 2007).
2Irma Specht, Practice note 4: Socio-economic reintegration of ex-combatants (London, 2010);
Nat J. Colletta and Robert Muggah, ‘Context matters: interim stabilisation and second
generation approaches to security promotion’, Conflict, Security and Development 9 (4) (2009),
42553; UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Second generation disarmament, demobi-
lization and reintegration (DDR) practices in peace operations (New York, 2010); Robert
Muggah, Innovations in disarmament, demobilization and reintegration policy and research:
reflections on the last decade (Oslo, 2010).
3James Pugel, What the fighters say: a survey of ex-combatants in Liberia, FebruaryMarch
2006 (Monrovia, 2007).
4Macartan Humphreys and Jeremy M. Weinstein, What the fighters say: a survey of ex-
combatants in Sierra Leone, JuneAugust 2003 (New York and Stanford, 2004).
5Kathleen M. Jennings, ‘The struggle to satisfy: DDR through the eyes of ex-combatants in
Liberia’, International Peacekeeping 14 (2) (2007), 20418.
6Laurie Nathan, No ownership, no commitment: a guide to local ownership of security sector
reform (2nd edn, Birmingham, 2007).
7Ana Cutter Patel, ‘Transitional justice, DDR, and security sector reform’, in Ana Cutter
Patel, Pablo de Greiff and Lars Waldorf (eds), Disarming the past: transitional justice and
excombatants (New York, 2009), 26283.
8Mats R. Berdal, Disarmament and demobilisation after Civil Wars Adelphi Paper 303 (Oxford,
1996); Robert Muggah, ‘No magic bullet: a critical perspective on disarmament, demobilization
and reintegration (DDR) and weapons reduction in post-conflict contexts’, Round Table 94 (379)
(2005), 23952; United Nations, IDDRS.
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Reintegration is the process by which ex-combatants acquire civilian status
and gain sustainable employment and income. Reintegration is essentially a
social and economic process with an open timeframe, primarily taking place
in communities at the local level. It is part of the general development of a
country and a national responsibility, and often necessitates long-term
external assistance.9
DDR has, in fact, been conceptualised either in minimalist terms, where related
or ongoing activities are seen as the proper concern of other programmes and
agencies; or in maximalist terms, in which a wider range of responsibilities to be
covered by DDR is envisaged.
PARTICIPATORY APPROACHES
The context in which a DDR programme is supposed to be implemented can
include destroyed infrastructure, economic disruption, population movement,
trauma and loss of social capital, amounting to a fragile or barely-existent state.
DDR and post-conflict reconstruction are part of a continuum, leading on to
recovery and development. Given that this is the general context in which DDR
programmes apply, the framework used for this present study of the re-
integration of ex-combatants in Sierra Leone is in fact taken from the discourse
within development: namely, a ‘participatory approach’ to designing and
implementing programmes. The concept is most closely associated with Robert
Chambers,10 and has been promoted by those agencies committed to a
‘partnership’ approach to development, by working with and through
nationally-based non-governmental organisations (NGOs). Participation re-
quires, among other things, that the intended beneficiaries of a development
programme are genuinely involved in, consulted on and make input to, the main
stages of its planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation.
The objective is not only that a better and more relevant programme is
developed; a participatory approach also aims to engender a higher level of
ownership of the programme by the community, to promote the building of
capacity and social capital among actors in the country and to ensure greater
sustainability of the programme’s outputs. The importance of these factors in
relation to DDR is that re-integration of ex-combatants can be a difficult
process for all parties, including the communities being asked to accept them,
and therefore it requires political buy-in at several levels if it is to be sustainable.
The need to engage with communities and to build their capacity in the
aftermath of conflict has previously been highlighted in the literature.11
A badly conceived or managed process, in which there is inadequate
participation, can lead to resentment, unfulfilled expectations and a perception
of unfair rewards for militia members. All these factors can in turn affect the
outcome negatively.
A number of typologies or ‘ladders’ of participation have been developed,
which usefully distinguish between various senses in which the term is used and
highlight the degrees of sincerity with which the concept may be employed.
Both those advocating and critiquing participation point to the gap between
9UN Secretary-General, Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, Report of the
Secretary-General to UN General Assembly, A/60/705, 2 March 2006, 8.
10Robert Chambers, Whose reality counts? Putting the first last (London, 1997); Robert
Chambers, Challenging the professions: frontiers for rural development (London, 1998).
11Gwinyayi Albert Dzinesa, ‘A participatory approach to DDR: empowering local institutions
and abilities’, Conflict Trends (3) (2006), 3943.
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aspiration and reality, and highlight the significant power imbalances between
stakeholders.12 Pretty has based his ladder of participation on earlier iterations
(see Table 1), and it addresses the important issue of relations between those
making an intervention and the intended beneficiaries.13 The most inadequate
of the seven categories of participation presented in Pretty’s typology is
described as ‘passive participation’,14 whereby people are told what has been
done or will happen: ‘It is a unilateral announcement by an administration or
project management without listening to people’s responses. The information
being shared belongs only to external professionals’.15 Other sub-optimal
manifestations of participation include the involvement of communities in
return for material incentives, but with decision-making still retained by
powerful outsiders; there are restricted agendas or frameworks within which
issues are raised. At the final point on the scale, which is described as ‘self-
mobilization’,16 communities are not only carrying out their own analysis and
setting the agenda, they are also independently accessing outside resources or
assistance, while retaining control over how these are used. Fundamental
concerns that are explored in this typology include the issue of who sets the
agenda, controls access to resources and ultimately exercises power. Although
most discussion of the concept of participation presumes a more stable
environment than an immediate post-war situation, the ladder is a useful way
of comparing how re-integration programmes have been planned and im-
plemented.
This study proposes that the ladder of participation is a valuable tool in
analysing DDR programmes, especially in terms of exposing their inherent
power dynamic and the question of local ownership. It queries the extent to
which a participatory approach was taken in Sierra Leone’s DDR programme,
and what enabling factors might be at play in facilitating such an approach. In
addition to the concept of participation, this study is located within the
framework of peace-building. This moves beyond peacekeeping and mediation
to look at implementing peace agreements and the wider range of issues
affecting peace processes. Peace-building therefore extends to addressing
underlying causes of conflict and to considering communities’ capacity to
deal with future conflict without the use of violence.17
METHODS18
The study is based on data gathered in Sierra Leone’s capital (Freetown) and in
and around three main towns (Bo, Kenema and Makeni). This provided a mix
12Bill Cooke and Uma Kothari, ‘The case for participation as tyranny’, in Bill Cooke and Uma
Kothari (eds), Participation: the new tyranny? (London and New York, 2001), 115; Andrea
Cornwall, ‘Unpacking ‘Participation’: models, meanings and practices’, Community Development
Journal 43 (3) (2008), 26983; Niamh Gaynor, Transforming participation? The politics of
development in Malawi and Ireland (Basingstoke, 2010); Niamh Gaynor, ‘Between citizenship and
clientship: the politics of participatory governance in Malawi’, Journal Of Southern African
Studies 36 (4) (2010), 80116.
13Jules Pretty, ‘Participatory learning for sustainable agriculture’, World Development 23 (8)
(1995), 124763.
14Pretty, ‘Participatory learning for sustainable agriculture’, 1252.
15Jules Pretty, Irene Guijt, John Thompson and Ian Scoones, A trainer’s guide for participatory
learning and action (London, 1995), 61.
16Pretty, ‘Participatory learning for sustainable agriculture’, 1252.
17Michael Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis, Making war and building peace: United Nations
peace operations (Princeton, 2006).
18It should be noted that the data-collection undertaken in this study was in fact part of a
larger study of re-integration in both Sierra Leone and Liberia.
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of city, town and semi-rural environments across the country from which to
draw participants for the research. The methods used for data collection were:
(1) semi-structured interviews with ex-combatants, members of the com-
munities accepting them back and those involved in designing and
implementing the re-integration programme;
Table 1. Pretty’s typology of participation: how people participate in development
programmes and projects*
Typology Characteristics of each type
1. Manipulative
participation
Participation is simply a pretence, with ‘people’s’ representatives on
official boards but who are unelected and have no power.
2. Passive participation People participate by being told what has been decided or has already
happened. It involves unilateral announcements by an administration or
project management without any listening to people’s responses. The
information being shared belongs only to external professionals.
3. Participation by
consultation
People participate by being consulted or by answering questions.
External agents define problems and information gathering processes,
and so control analysis. Such a consultative process does not concede
any share in decision making, and professionals are under no obligation
to take on board people’s views.
4. Participation for material
incentives
People participate by contributing resources, for example, labor, in
return for food, cash or other material incentives. Farmers may provide
the fields and labor, but are involved in neither experimentation nor the
process of learning. It is very common to see this called participation,
yet people have no stake in prolonging technologies or practices when
the incentives end.
5. Functional participation Participation seen by external agencies as a means to achieve project
goals, especially reduced costs. People may participate by forming
groups to meet predetermined objectives related to the project. Such
involvement may be interactive and involve shared decision making, but
tends to arise only after major decisions have already been made by
external agents. At worst, local people may still only be coopted to serve
external goals.
6. Interactive participation People participate in joint analysis, development of action plans and
formation or strengthening of local institutions. Participation is seen as
a right, not just the means to achieve project goals. The process involves
interdisciplinary methodologies that seek multiple perspectives and
make use of systemic and structured learning processes. As groups take
control over local decisions and determine how available resources are
used, so they have a stake in maintaining structures or practices.
7. Self-mobilization People participate by taking initiatives independently of external
institutions to change systems. They develop contacts with external
institutions for resources and technical advice they need, but retain
control over how resources are used. Self-mobilization can spread if
governments and NGOs provide an enabling framework of support.
Such self-initiated mobilization may or may not challenge existing
distributions of wealth and power.
*Source: Jules Pretty, ‘Participatory learning for sustainable agriculture’, World Development 23
(8) (1995), 124763: 1252. Pretty cites several earlier sources from which his typology, reproduced
here, is adapted.
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(2) a questionnaire for ex-combatants, which was developed prior to the
research trip and piloted in-country (32 respondents); and
(3) six focus group discussions with ex-combatants.19
In order to find participants for the survey and focus groups, the snowball
sampling method was used, based on several initial introductions in each
locality. There were, therefore, several entry points to the population. The
rationale for choosing this sampling method was dictated partly by the issue of
building trust with potential participants, who might otherwise be reluctant to
talk to outsiders. Since purposive rather than random sampling was used for
the survey, which in any case had a small number of respondents, it is not
possible to generalise with any certainty from the sample to the wider
population of ex-combatants. Once this limitation is made explicit, however,
some useful insights can be gleaned, both from the quantative aspects of the
survey and the open-ended questions used. Excerpts from the survey are
intended to be illustrative. The qualitative data analysis of the focus group
transcripts identified key themes, which recurred. A coding frame was
developed in an iterative fashion, using the NVivo software to structure the
analysis.
DATA GATHERED ON PARTICIPATORY APPROACHES
Entry to the re-integration programme in Sierra Leone came after ex-combatants
voluntarily surrendered any weapons they had, received some initial support and
typically stayed for a time in a demobilisation camp, where they received
orientation on civilian life and options for them during the re-integration phase.
These usually consisted of a return to education, or vocational training in areas
such as hairdressing, driving, car maintenance, or as an electrician. Children
were diverted when they arrived into a separate programme, which usually
involved greater support in an interim care centre, and re-integration by
returning them to education within their original community, if possible.
The extent to which participatory approaches formed part of these
re-integration programmes is assessed here using the ladder of participation.
The elementary stages of participation, or the ‘lowest rungs’ of the ladder,
simply involve the ex-combatants receiving information about the programme.
This does not even extend as far as consultation or making an input to
decisions, but even at this rung on the ladder shortcomings in regard to the
amount and accuracy of information provided to ex-combatants are apparent.
The information was often perceived as not being borne out by events; that it
was inaccurate; or even that it was deliberately misleading, involving lies and
deception. In addition to this perceived miscommunication, there is the related
issue of unrealistic expectations being created, whether inadvertently or not.
Explanations of re-integration and their accuracy
The first issue the study examined is the amount of information about
re-integration that was received by ex-combatants. They were asked in the
survey, using a three-point Likert scale, if the re-integration process had been
19The term ‘ex-combatant’ is used throughout this study to mean all those who were associated
with armed forces or fighting groups. It is not limited to those who actually fought, carried a
weapon, or had a gun to ensure their entry to a DDR programme. It therefore also covers those
who served as cooks, porters and intelligence gatherers, or those who were subjected to forced
marriage to commanders.
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explained. While a majority of the respondents said they felt they had received
enough information, and had met an official who gave them advice, much fewer
of them felt they had the clearer understanding that an explanation of the
process would have provided. When it came to whether the information they
had been given was accurate, the majority reversed dramatically, with more
than two-thirds saying it was not (see Figure 1). The discrepancy is statistically
significant within the sample (p  0.000, Fisher’s exact test). It also shows that
the negative views expressed by ex-combatants were not simply a function
of a generalised disaffection, or a reaction to current difficulties in daily life:
they were well able to distinguish between those aspects of the process they
found positive (the amount of information received about the re-integration
programme) and other more negative experiences (such as its accuracy).
The problems with the information-giving process can be placed on a
spectrum, and this helps to indicate different levels of foreknowledge or
motivation on the part of the information-provider. In the present case, this
refers to information given directly by those involved in administering the DDR
programme, rather than second-hand information passed on by commanders,
friends and other ex-combatants. As in all communication processes, both the
sender and the receiver of the message play a role in the possibility of problems
arising. On one hand, we see the need for those administering DDR to take into
account the possibility of their words being misunderstood or taken up
incorrectly*for example, an expression of intention to provide certain benefits,
or a possibility of certain benefits being available, may be taken as a firm
commitment that such benefits will actually be provided. The possibilities for
misunderstanding on the part of the receiver are of course considerable: some
ex-combatants may have difficulties in dealing with the authorities or with
forward planning; others may receive information second-hand, possibly via
commanders who simplify or exaggerate the promised benefits for their own
purposes; some would have missed out on basic education during the conflict;
and some may be dependent on drugs, and might not be able to focus on
complex explanations or long-term gains.
Figure 1. Amount and quality of information provided about DDR programme
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The spectrum, then, begins with poor communication, inadequate informa-
tion and the unintentional creation of unrealistic expectations. Further along
the spectrum, there is the possibility of inaccurate information which is given in
good faith. At this point on the spectrum, the problems amount to unfulfilled
commitments and broken promises: the incorrect information was actually
given, rather than the difficulty being an incorrect perception arising from poor
communication. The furthest end of the spectrum entails knowingly misleading
ex-combatants, or giving information known at the time to be incorrect; or
making commitments that the information-provider knows are not going to be
fulfilled.
Leaving aside false impressions created either deliberately or unintentionally
by non-DDR sources (such as family, commanders, or other ex-combatants),
the scale can be summarised as follows:
(1) Misunderstandings by ex-combatants, based on genuine and correct
information from the DDR programme that is properly communicated.
This situation may be exacerbated by ex-combatants’ experiences of
dealing with people in authority, alienation from those in power, high
expectations, lack of education, drug dependency or lack of trust.
(2) Poor communication from the DDR programme (in which statements
are badly expressed or open to a number of reasonable interpretations,
or suggestions about possibilities are vaguely worded and understood to
be a certainty), resulting in ex-combatants arriving at the wrong
conclusion about just how much is being promised.
(3) Genuine information, properly expressed and understood, about how
the programme would be run, but which subsequently is not followed
through, due to failures or shortcomings in the implementation of the
programme. Failure of programmes may arise in these circumstances
due to problems with different agencies (such as implementing NGOs)
rather than because of any shortcoming on the part of those originally
providing the information. Nevertheless, the outcome may ultimately be
interpreted by ex-combatants as broken promises, false information or
deliberate deception.
(4) Information that is unintentionally inaccurate.
(5) Deliberate vagueness on the part of those providing information,
knowing that this will create a false impression; deliberately misleading
ex-combatants; and deception.
From the perspective of the ex-combatants, it may be difficult to distinguish
between ‘false information’ (given deliberately or not) and a failure to deliver on
benefits that had genuinely been intended. These categories are not, of course,
mutually exclusive, and problems may arise through a combination of poor or
inaccurate communication and a failure to deliver on benefits that ex-
combatants participating in DDR programmes are in fact supposed to receive.
There is an underlying sense of the power relationship, and perhaps a
difficulty in dealing with officials, in many of the focus group discussions
around this issue:
I don’t really know because what they told us they were going to do, they
didn’t do all. We didn’t get any further information from them even when we
tried asking what they were going to do for us, they didn’t tell us.
(Unidentified participant, Focus Group E, Bo)
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Benefits that ex-combatants felt had been promised but were not received came
up repeatedly in discussions with the participants in the Sierra Leone study. For
example, there were many references to the re-integration identity card issued to
them. These cards carried four letters, from A to D, each of which was
supposed to be punched when a particular benefit was received. Participants
complained, however, that some parts of the benefit package were not provided
despite this, and others said that sometimes two letters were punched when only
one element of the benefit was actually provided:
In some cases they would perforate A to C independently. In other cases, they
would perforate both A and B, for just A’s benefits. The D was never
perforated, that had huge benefits [attached]. Some were as lucky as not to
have C perforated. We have rallied around, yet to no avail, especially in my
case, two holes were perforated for one, so that the benefits would be
siphoned off. Complaints were made several times to the police, but to no
avail. They would even call [to the DDR programme], but nothing would
come out of it.
(Participant 1, Focus Group B, Bo)
Delays in payment of stipends, or non-payment, were among the biggest
complaints relating to benefits promised to the ex-combatants but not received,
along with missing start-up toolkits, which were supposed to be part of the
vocational training. The duration and quality of the training was also often
mentioned.
Expectations, promises and deceit
The perception of ‘broken promises’ arises partly from expectations. In one
case, a participant in Focus Group E was unhappy that his preferred training
option*driving*was not available, so he had to opt for training as an auto
mechanic instead. To him, this was an example of an unfulfilled promise, but
the reality is that only a limited number of people could in fact be trained for
the most popular options, such as driving, as the labour market could only
absorb a limited number of drivers.
There is a strong sense that expectations such as these were created among
the ex-combatants in Sierra Leone in the context of what was clearly
understood to be a ‘deal’, in which benefits would be provided in return for
handing over weapons.
Before I say anything, I have to bring out my view: I deeply regret [very
emphatic] that I handed over my gun. If I had known that such was going to
be, I would not have given my gun. I would be in the jungle still. Just as my
brother was saying the tool[kit] was not sufficient for us. Yes. I was trained as
a carpenter. Right now, I am dis. . .I don’t even know what to say.
(Participant 4, Focus Group C, Bo)
For many ex-combatants, the failure to provide expected benefits was clearly
seen as a broken promise. In terms of participation in the DDR programme,
this breach of trust is worse than receiving no information at all, and it came to
define their relationship with those running the re-integration programmes. The
benefits were clearly understood to have been commitments made at the start of
the programme, and sometimes even before disarmament took place.
Nothing of what they promised, did they give us.
(Participant 3, Focus Group A, Bo)
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One participant thanked the moderator ‘a lot’ for asking about how things were
between him and his family. He felt bad that due to his economic situation, he
‘was not a father’ to his children, because he was unable to provide for their
needs, such as education:
The problem lies with those who promised things to us but did not fulfil.
Benefits were expected which we would have used to ensure support for our
families, and these were not provided. That is why my kids are all in the
streets, so you can see that my condition is terrible, I swear to God.
(Participant 4, Focus Group A, Bo)
Focus group participants were also asked how they would go about running
a re-integration programme. The issue of making unfulfilled promises came up
again, as did the importance of providing those things to which ex-combatants
are entitled. When it came to advice for anyone who might be entering a DDR
programme, the comments again brought up the question of unfulfilled
expectations, and the participants’ experiences regarding what they considered
to be broken promises. Many, in fact, said they thought the re-integration
programmes were a good idea, if implemented properly. However, one
respondent said he would advise others not to take part, because he had
been lied to.
There is one other step beyond that of broken or unfulfilled promises in the
spectrum as outlined above, and that would be premeditated deception of the
ex-combatants by those running the programmes. While many focus group
participants mentioned inaccurate or inadequate information in general, some
of which was described in terms of broken promises, a much smaller group
again attributed this to a deliberate act of lying, deceit or being cheated of their
entitlements. The implications of this for trust in the whole process are not
good.
One participant highlighted the fact that civilians received benefits intended
for ex-combatants as one of the ways in which the programme was undermined
by deception:
The DDR idea is a very salient one. And even for the ex-combatants who had
been a wanderer in the bush, to now have to give up the guns for 60,000
[Leones] is fine. That gun was the weapon he would threaten people with,
now he had decided to hand it over so he can live a liberated life. Such an
idea is really good. But the implementation is poor, because it’s mixed up
with deceit and theft. For what was promised to us was not given.
(Participant 3, Focus Group A, Bo)
The same issue comes up again when the question is raised of advice from
the ex-combatants for someone who might take part in a re-integration
programme:
Well if it is my own brother who is to partake, I will advise him not to do so
because they did not do what they promised us. I will advise him not to go
because they lied to us.
(Unidentified participant, Focus Group F, Kenema)
Survey open-ended questions
The final part of the current survey asked a number of open-ended questions.
The first of these was as follows: ‘If you were running a DDR programme now,
what things would you do to help people feel included in the process, and have
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their views listened to?’ A recurring theme in the responses to this question
related to being listened to, as suggested by these respondents:
I would listen to them, and allow them to fully participate
I would make them tell me what can be done to make them develop
themselves and the nation
I would try to know what they want
(Selected responses to Question J1)
When asked ‘How or why would that help’, most of the respondents referred to
improvements in the programme or its implementation, such as the provision of
correct training, or a proper programme benefiting the right people. There was
also an open-ended question asking ‘What would you avoid doing?’ The
responses in this instance were dominated by concerns about corruption, theft,
false promises and the exclusion of ex-combatants from benefits. The issue of
corruption or mismanagement had not in fact been mentioned at all in the
survey, so its emergence as an issue was entirely unprompted. It was mentioned
spontaneously by nearly half of the respondents, as exemplified by these replies:
Corrupt practices
Not to take bribe
I would not eat [steal] people’s benefits
No theft
(Selected responses to Question J3)
Other common themes were false promises, marginalisation and deception, or
building up expectations.
Corruption is not generally mentioned in the literature on participation, yet
as has been seen, it was very relevant as an issue in this current study. It
recurred continually in the focus groups, survey and interviews as a topic
brought up spontaneously when the integrity, honesty or effectiveness of the
programme was being discussed. It is also relevant more generally, given that
both the reality and the perception of corruption and poor governance
fundamentally undermine the social contract at the heart of DDR and of any
participatory approach. Participation is based on addressing the interests of the
beneficiaries rather than just the donors or those implementing the programme;
on honest communication in both directions; and on shared decision-making,
to whatever extent. These essential aspects of a participatory approach are
negated when the interests or voice of another group*those mismanaging the
programme or diverting resources*replace the perspective of the beneficiaries.
Corruption and the diversion of resources are also fundamentally at variance
with even the lower rungs of the ladder of participation*those relating to the
sharing of accurate information about how a programme would proceed.
Corruption is particularly problematic when its influence is hidden or unstated,
as it supplants any attempt at dialogue and consultation. Finally, while
participation is ultimately about addressing asymmetrical power relationships
and attempting to frame them in a way that makes them more amenable to
being challenged, corruption and the diversion of benefits intended for
ex-combatants are a function of the power imbalance, expressed in a way
that avoids even the pretence of consultation or accountability.
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CONSULTATION AND SHARED DECISION-MAKING
The next stage in the progression towards self-mobilisation as one moves up the
ladder of participation involves the creation of a two-way information flow:
the extent to which the views of ex-combatants participating in a DDR
programme are passed on, sought, or considered by those designing and
running the programmes. This largely relates to consultation, rather than
actually sharing decision-making to any considerable extent in terms of
programme design. (This is distinct from individuals who participate in DDR
programmes making choices about their own future by selecting from a
predetermined list of educational or vocational training options.) It does,
however, touch on stakeholders’ views being taken into account when it comes
to any modification of how specific details in the programme are implemented,
especially after representations are made or views expressed.
In terms of a re-integration programme, the specific ways in
which possibilities for participation might manifest themselves include the
following:
. expressing an opinion;
. being asked for one’s view;
. being listened to;
. awareness on the part of those running the programme of the needs of ex-
combatants;
. choices being available from a list of re-integration options (education,
training, etc,) and choice in regard to their location;
. consultation with children about where they would return to (original
community, relative, etc.);
. input to decisions on how the programme is run (as opposed to individual
choices); and
. lobbying for benefits (stipends, toolkits, etc.).
Most of the definitions of participation deal with communities which are stable,
and which may have organisations or structures for conducting analysis,
expressing views or making decisions. The participatory elements in regard to
re-integration, however, are more often seen at the individual rather than the
community level, partly because the demobilisation phase aims to break the
ex-combatants’ link with commanders and to help them forge a non-military
identity. Many ex-combatants will in fact share an identity, and relationships
with commanders can persist beyond the war into civilian life; yet their
engagement with the re-integration programme and the decisions made
regarding post-conflict life are generally on an individual basis, rather than
as a group. Participation usually depends on social capital and group structures,
which are more problematic during DDR. These factors are more likely to be
relevant when it comes to engaging with communities rather than individual
ex-combatants, and this was seen specifically in the programme to re-integrate
child combatants, for example, and community-level programming is also a
useful way to engage all stakeholders and allow them to interact and rebuild
relationships.
Being asked for an opinion
One of the most basic measures of participation is whether ex-combatants feel
that their views were sought during the process. In the study under discussion,
survey respondents were asked if they had ever been asked for their opinion
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about the way disarmament and demobilisation was being carried out, and the
same question was later asked in relation to the re-integration phase of the
programme (see Table 2). Although the sample sizes were small, those saying
they had been asked their opinion were outnumbered four-to-one by those
saying they had not. Again, these figures are included to illustrate a point,
rather than as an attempt to represent what all DDR participants feel.
Going beyond the matter of whether ex-combatants’ opinions were solicited,
the participants in the current study were then surveyed on the extent to which
their views were in fact taken on board during DDR process. Question E1
asked: ‘Did you feel your views in general were listened to by those running the
programmes?’ The responses were overwhelmingly negative, as Figure 2 shows.
The issue of whether the ex-combatants’ opinions had been sought was also
raised in the focus group discussions. The responses again point to an
understandable emphasis on securing livelihoods and self-sufficiency after the
war, given the extreme economic conditions at the time and subsequently. One
former commander said that during the implementation of the training aspect
of the programme, at a point when payment of benefits had become an issue,
speaking up could have consequences when dealing with people who were
corrupt. He had been asked if they ever sought his opinion:
There was no time for that. They had no time for that, even if you grumble
they will seize the little you were supposed have [the benefits].
(Participant 3, Focus Group B, Bo)
Another highlighted the difference between being asked for one’s view and
seeing the desires which they expressed being fulfilled. They were able to
distinguish between these two elements:
Yes they did asked us how we would want to see the programme. They did
ask us . . . But, our own view that we gave them, some of them were not
considered.
(Unidentified participant, Focus Group E, Bo)
A slightly different measure of the extent to which the ex-combatants who
went through the DDR programmes felt their views were taken on board was
explored in Question E3: ‘Did you feel that people running the programmes
knew what your needs were?’ This goes beyond consultation to a higher level of
participation, in terms of programming being more closely shaped to
participants’ needs. A clear majority (see Figure 3) felt that their needs were
not known at all by those running the programmes.
Those who were children at the time of demobilisation were more likely to
say their needs were known. This difference is significant (p  0.024, using
Fisher’s exact test). Two-thirds of them said their needs were known ‘a bit, to
Table 2. Being consulted on DDR
About disarmament and
demobilisation
About re-integration
Asked for your opinion? Number Percentage Number Percentage
Yes 5 20% 4 19%
No 20 80% 17 81%
Total 25 21
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some extent’, whereas just over three-quarters of adults said their needs were
not known ‘at all’.
As a more specific measure of the degree to which the ex-combatants felt
their views had been taken into account, Question E5 asked: ‘Did anything you
said have any effect on how things were done?’20 The response, as indicated in
Figure 4, was overwhelmingly negative.
The choice of re-integration training or education is for many ex-combatants
the most significant way in which they had a say on how the DDR programme
would benefit them. In this sense, it is of course something which touches on
participation. Yet it is not necessarily participation per se: even a non-
participatory programme would still have offered those engaged in the
programme a choice in the matter, if only for the sake of matching people’s
skills and aptitudes to the relevant options. The training and education choices
available were from a specified list of options, not least because there could be
training capacity only for certain trades, and ultimately labour market demand
was restricted to a certain number of people in each sector. So, while making a
choice in relation to training is a significant moment in the life in each
ex-combatant, in which their decision could have far-reaching consequences, it
is not the same as full participation in the re-integration process in its most
developed sense. However, one example from the DDR programme appears to
indicate real imagination and flexibility on the part of those implementing
the programming. The particular participant involved had said earlier that he
‘did not take any training because it was boring and I was born a dancer’, and
when asked if there were any examples of his input having an effect on the
programme, he said:
When I said I cannot go through training they brought me to the Sierra
Leonean national dance troupe to become a better dancer. Now I have been
to Europe, America and some African countries through dancing.
(Response to Question E6)
Figure 2. Were your views listened to? (Question E1)
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20This kind of question does risk conflating the matter of ‘being heard’ with that of whether
specific needs were met, it has to be said. However, the qualitative data indicate that many
ex-combatants were able to make a distinction between the two ideas.
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Lobbying for benefits
Ex-combatants frequently mentioned having to lobby or campaign for the
benefits they felt they were entitled to. This came up spontaneously in
different focus groups, and it underlines the sense of disempowerment that
many felt*a feeling that often contributed to disillusionment with the process,
when they sensed their petitions were not heard. Some members of the group
of Sierra Leonean ex-combatants involved in the present study would have
been in a position during the war where they had the upper hand, as a person
bearing arms and power but having little accountability for their actions. The
role reversal, loss of status and identity shift involved in the transition from
war to peace would have been quite disorientating for some, especially in the
context of largely unaddressed post-traumatic stress disorder. Sometimes the
attempts to lobby and to be heard were associated with real anger, especially
Figure 3. Did those running the programmes know your needs? (Question E3)
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Figure 4. Did what you say have any effect on the implementation of the programme?
(Question E5)
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among those ex-combatants who felt they had in fact served in defence of their
community.
CONCLUSIONS
This study focused on the views of ex-combatants in Sierra Leone involved in
the DDR programme implemented there, rather than on the receiving
communities or those implementing the programme. Whereas some positive
methodologies were utilised in the specific work of some of the child protection
agencies engaged in re-integration, such as their consultation with communities
receiving ex-combatant children after their demobilisation, it is clear that many
ex-combatants’ perceptions of the re-integration programme are negative, in
terms of a participatory approach. The ex-combatants who provided data for
the present study saw significant problems with even the most basic elements of
participation, such as the provision of accurate information. This is one of the
very bottom rungs on the ladder of participation. The problems with the
provision of information did not relate so much to the amount of information
available, which many felt was adequate in as far as it went, but with its
perceived accuracy.
The nature of this inaccuracy is important to consider, as it arises from the
discrepancy between what was believed to have been promised, and what
actually came about. As discussed above, this discrepancy can be due to
imperfect information, or information given in good faith but which turns out
to be inaccurate because programme implementation does not go according to
plan. In the Sierra Leonean case, there were many actors, and those who
explained the programme to ex-combatants were not always the same people
who were involved in implementing it later. However, trust, faith in the process
and a sense of ownership by key stakeholders were seriously undermined by
the problems the ex-combatants perceived with the information. The fact that
that this was sometimes attributed to deliberate deception shows the depth of
feeling. When it comes to the next rungs on the ladder of participation,
problems were also perceived among the ex-combatants in terms of being
heard or having an input in decision-making relating to the DDR programme.
A participatory approach is not necessarily measured by the degree of
satisfaction that stakeholders express with a programme’s outcomes (which is a
function of many different factors besides participation). This is especially so in
a complex, fluid and difficult post-war environment such as that of Sierra
Leone, where capacity constraints, population movement and security concerns
had a significant impact. The situation is further complicated by the fact that
programmes for ex-combatants can be seen by the wider community as
favouring those who persecuted them*and the general community had
enormous needs and challenges of its own after more than a decade of civil
war. So, while generalised disappointment with the programme outcome was
expressed by many ex-combatants, particularly in terms of being affected by
poverty, trying to find employment and attempting to improve their livelihoods,
the data presented here indicate that the lack of participatory processes in the
country’s DDR programme was seen as a problem in itself, and is not just a
manifestation of broad-based discontent.
Some of the factors working against a participatory approach to such
programmes that can usefully be explored in further research include the
short timeframe for DDR programmes; the needs of donors for quick,
measurable results and a definite exit strategy; post-war disruption and lack
of capacity within the country and the agencies asked to implement the
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programme; lack of forward planning; divergent interests, agendas and
cultures among the many agencies involved; and security concerns, instability
and population movement.
The views which emerged in the course of the present study show that
a ladder of participation is a useful way of analysing the experiences of
ex-combatants and understanding their relationship with re-integration pro-
grammes. Within the multi-faceted model called ‘participation’, the ladder
exposes key concepts of power, communication, expectations, consultation,
inclusion in decision-making and trust. It also raises the question of
ex-combatants’ agency in the re-integration and peace-building process.
Participatory processes*or their absence*are inherently linked to the question
of regenerating social capital in a post-war society.21 These concepts are not just
additive: they are a process in their own right, combining to form an essential
part of the relationship between ex-combatants and those with power, be they
staff from local authorities or international agencies. Judgements are made by
ex-combatants about actors and their motivation or reliability, and about the
way in which their own actions are likely to improve their situation.
The ideas mentioned in this study may or may not be part of the everyday
language of ex-combatants; they are, however, the basis that is used to infer the
rules of the game, to quickly form a causal model of ‘how things work’, using an
intuitive process of induction based on the way things play out. The experiences
of the ex-combatants in relation to credibility, accuracy of information,
diversion or non-payment of benefits and a sense of actually having been
heard during any consultation process, are vital in determining this important
relationship with those who now hold power. What they infer from their
experience of DDR affects not just the level of trust in the process by
ex-combatants, but also the whole idea of a new ‘social contract’ that DDR
involves, the ex-combatants’ notion of governance in the post-war situation,
and how they see themselves in this picture.22 This understanding of their
relationship to the DDR process therefore influences ex-combatants’ actions
and behaviour towards society and the reconstruction project, arising from
their sense of inclusion and ownership (or otherwise). Ultimately, it helps them
to define the way they see themselves in society, both now and in the future,
which is one of the key elements in social re-integration. An effective DDR
programme in which the participants share a sense of ownership is also one that
is more likely to be truly embedded in a holistic process of peace-building,
rather than being just another intervention.
An assessment of re-integration from the point of view of participation is
consistent with the more innovative approaches being discussed in second-
generation DDR, and with the ideals expressed in the UN’s Integrated DDR
21The concept of social capital in relation to conflict, reconciliation and re-integration is
explored by Richard Bowd, ‘From combatant to civilian: the social reintegration of
ex-combatants in Rwanda and the implications for social capital and reconciliation’, unpublished
PhD thesis, University of York, 2008, available at http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?did1
&uinuk.bl.ethos.516644 (3 June 2011); Richard Bowd, ‘Burning the bridges and breaking the
bonds: social capital and its transformative influence in relation to violent conflict’, Journal of
Conflict Transformation and Security 1 (1) (2011), 3762.
22DDR is framed as a ‘new social contract’ between the ex-combatants and the government
and international community by Mark Knight and Alpaslan O¨zerdem, ‘Guns, camps and cash:
disarmament, demobilization and reinsertion of former combatants in transitions from war to
peace’, Journal Of Peace Research 41 (4) 2004, 499516: 504. Knight and O¨zerdem contend that if
the former fighters are given any reason to doubt the effectiveness of the DDR programme, this
could undermine their belief that the peace agreement of which the programme is part will be
implemented impartially.
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Standards. It goes beyond the ‘minimalist’ versus ‘maximalist’ dichotomy in
DDR thinking and complements the longstanding calls for better forward
planning and a holistic, integrated approach to re-integration. In the end, DDR
programmes are, at best, only facilitators of the process of re-integrating ex-
combatants.23 Former fighters and their communities have been dealing with
this issue for millennia, and will continue to face it whenever there is war,
whether or not outsiders get involved to try to help the process. Deciding that
DDR programmes are of no use, or must be changed radically, does not mean
that the difficult questions about re-integration, which challenge all stake-
holders, simply disappear; the way in which the programmes are run, however,
can affect how these problematic questions are approached.
23I am indebted to Irma Specht of Transition International for highlighting this perspective,
through the training courses run by her organisation jointly with International Alert.
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